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2Abstract1
Garrett Hardin's tragedy of the commons is an analogy that shows how2
individuals driven by self-interest can end up destroying the resource3
upon which they all depend. The proposed solutions for humans rely on4
highly advanced skills such as negotiation, which raises the question5
of how non-human organisms manage to resolve similar tragedies. In recent6
years, this question has promoted evolutionary biologists to apply the7
tragedy of the commons to a wide range of biological systems. Here we8
provide tools to categorize different types of tragedies, and review9
different mechanisms that can resolve conflicts that could otherwise end10
in tragedy, including kinship, policing and diminishing returns. A11
central open question, however, is how often biological systems are able12
to resolve these scenarios rather than drive themselves extinct through13
individual-level selection favouring self-interested behaviours.14
15
The Tragedy of the Commons16
The tragedy of the commons (see glossary) provides a useful analogy allowing us to17
understand why shared resources, such as fisheries or the global climate, tend to18
undergo human overexploitation [1]. The analogy, which dates back over a century19
prior to Hardin’s original paper [2], describes the consequences of individuals20
selfishly over-exploiting a common resource. The tragedy of the commons was21
originally applied to a group of herders grazing cattle on a common land. Each herder22
only gains a benefit from his own flock, but when a herder adds more cattle to the23
3land to graze everyone shares the cost, which comes from reducing the amount of1
forage per cattle. If the herders are driven only by economic self-interest, they will2
each realize that it is to their advantage to always add another animal to the common:3
they sacrifice the good of the group (by forgoing sustainable use of the resource) for4
their own selfish gain. Thus, herders will continue to add animals, eventually leading5
to a “tragedy” where the pasture is destroyed by overgrazing [1].6
The difficulties inherent in protecting shared common resources, such as marine7
stocks or clean air, are well known: while everyone benefits from an intact resource,8
there is an individual-level temptation to cheat (e.g. to overexploit or pollute) because9
cheating brings economic advantages to the individual while costs are distributed10
among all individuals (see box 1). The lesson drawn from these studies is that solving11
the dilemma often requires negotiation and sanctions on disobedient individuals. This12
changes the payoffs, so that group-beneficial behaviour also becomes optimal for the13
individual: an example would be imposing heavier taxes on polluting industries.14
Hardin’s own main solution to the tragedy of the commons was state governance and15
privatization of the resource in question [1]; in general, social norms as well as16
individual morality have been considered good candidates for preventing17
overexploitation of common resources.18
Despite citing Lack’s work on population regulation [3] to contrast population19
regulation in birds with human population growth, Hardin did not venture to extend20
his analogy to the problems of evolutionary ecology. However, if the tragedy can only21
be avoided when higher-level incentives are invoked, as in the case of legal22
incentives, this raises the question of how non-human organisms can avoid23
overexploiting the resources they depend on. After the group selection debate of the24
41960s [4], it should be clear that this question is not trivial: natural selection acts1
primarily at the level of the gene, and therefore favours individuals which serve their2
own selfish interests [5]. Nevertheless, it is only in the last decade that the tragedy of3
the commons analogy has become increasingly used by evolutionary biologists (Table4
1) to explain why selfish individuals in animal and plant populations do not evolve to5
destroy the collective resource [e.g. 6, 7-13].6
A tragedy of the commons in evolutionary biology refers to a situation where7
individual competition over a resource reduces the resource itself, which can in turn8
reduce the fitness of the whole group [14]. The tragedies discussed here can apply to a9
range of levels: groups, population or species. The concept has been used in a10
diversity of fields in biology, ranging from plant-competition for resources [e.g. 7] to11
the evolution of cooperation and conflict in insect societies [e.g. 9]. What the12
tragedies have in common is that individuals are selfishly maximizing their own13
fitness at the expensive of the productivity of the group or population. Here we seek14
to review how the tragedy of the commons is used in the literature, with the hope of15
highlighting that the underlying principles are the same, regardless of the system or16
the level at which the tragedy of the commons occurs.17
Types of tragedies18
Despite the relatively recent acquisition of the tragedy of the commons analogy into19
evolutionary biology [but see 14], not all studies use the same definition for a tragedy20
of the commons, and there are many related terms (see glossary). As confusing21
terminology can hinder the development of a field [15], here we seek to define22
different forms of the tragedy of the commons (tables 1 and 2). What these tragedies23
all have in common is that individual selfishness reduces the resource over which24
5individuals are competing, and lowers group fitness. The tragedy of the commons in1
evolutionary biology therefore encompasses what social scientists call a public good2
game, or an N-person prisoner’s dilemma [e.g. 16].3
Resources prone to a tragedy of the commons4
One can distinguish between three types of group-level costs of competition, which5
may result in a tragedy of the commons (Table 2). The first, which fits exactly with6
Hardin’s original analogy, involves individuals selfishly exploiting a common7
resource until the resource is reduced to the point that the individuals no longer can8
persist on it. Examples include simple competition for food, but reproductive traits9
can also be involved, such as high virulence in parasites [17] and laying larger10
clutches in an attempt to out-reproduce others. While it has been suggested that only11
competition over an extrinsic resource should be viewed as a tragedy of the commons12
[e.g. 18], evolutionary biologists have applied the term to a much wider range of13
contexts [e.g. 6, 8, 9, 12, 19]. Figure 2a shows the case of bacteriphages surrounding a14
bacteria [12], a system which is prone to a tragedy of the commons when the15
virulence of the phages becomes so high that they destroy the bacterio on which they16
exist.17
While Hardin’s analogy was originally applied to the over-exploitation of an external18
resource, evolutionary biologists have realised that the analogy reflects a wide range19
of social dilemmas, and can potentially unify a number of fields. The tragedy of the20
commons has mostly been applied to social goods formed by cooperation (see tables 121
and 2). Social goods come in two, analogous forms. Most commonly the definition of22
a tragedy of the commons has been extended to cover what we term “social goods”23
(also known as public goods, illustrated by the example of stalk production in figure24
62b). These are cases where the resource does not exist extrinsically, instead it arises in1
a social context either through individuals investing in cooperation, or restraining2
from engaging in conflict with conspecifics. In the case of cooperation being the3
social good (type 2a in table 2), the tragedy of commons arises if non-contributing4
cheaters can gain their share of the common goods provided by cooperating5
individuals [e.g. 20]. Behaviours vulnerable to such a tragedy include sentinel6
behaviour in cooperatively breeding meerkats [e.g. 21], invertase production in yeast,7
which helps groups of yeast cells to break down sucrose, [22] or workers choosing to8
work rather than reproduce in social insect colonies [9].9
For example, individuals of the bacteria Myxoccocus xanthus cooperate to form10
complex fruiting structures which release spores. “Cheating” individuals, which don’t11
invest in building non-spore parts of the fruiting structures, produce more spores than12
wild type individuals, and can therefore invade and destroy the social good, causing13
the population to go extinct [19]. In all of these cases, a well functioning unit14
produces the best group fitness (i.e. mean fitness per individual), but it may be15
advantageous for the individual in question to free-ride and not contribute to the16
social good.17
The second type of social good (type 2b in table 2) involves individuals restraining18
from potentially competitive acts. For example, in territorial conflicts, the resource19
(the area over which fighting occurs) may remain intact, but the costs are paid by20
individuals who spend energy and time fighting. Engaging in conflict brings costs to21
all group members, either through increased injury or having to invest more in22
conflict. This is best illustrated by the case of plant competition for light (figure 2c),23
where the extrinsic resource (light) remains intact [10]. Taller plants gain more access24
7to light in order to compete with their neighbours, and so are relatively more1
successful than shorter plants. But height cannot be achieved without investment in2
sturdy vertical biomass. Selection therefore favours plants that grow taller and shade3
their shorter neighbours. But any attempt to outgrow one’s neighbour is a zero-sum4
game (see Glossary). Therefore, assuming that vertical structures contribute nothing5
to fecundity, we can predict taller trees, but less overall productivity. Such investment6
is wasteful at the group level in a similar vein when people sitting in audiences are7
forced to stand up if the first rows do so, until everyone pays the cost of having to8
stand up without any remaining improvement in the view to the stage. Tall plant9
populations, which likewise invest in an essentially zero-sum game, are indeed less10
productive [10].11
This example highlights how not all competition is ‘tragic’. If plant A outcompetes12
plant B, so that A through gaining all the light is equally productive as the whole13
group of A and B would have been in a non-competitive situation, there is no tragedy.14
But the investment necessary to outcompete others may give rise to a tragedy, as such15
investment reduces overall productivity. Individuals can then be argued to have16
destroyed the common good created by restraining from competition. In other words,17
collectively the group would do better if all plants were shorter, but individuals which18
invest in taller structures gain more light themselves and shade their conspecifics, will19
have a higher fitness in any situation. A tragedy can also occur in plant competition20
when the relevant structure is the root, and there is a reduction in fecundity through21
investment in below-ground competition [7, 23].22
Microbial biofilm production is an analogous situation, where production of23
extracellular polymers help individual cells push their descendents upwards to gain24
8much needed oxygen [24]. As a side effect, polymer production by these tall piles of1
cells suffocate non-polymer producing neighbours [24]. This is analogous to plant2
competition for light, in that vertical growth provides a competitive advantage over3
conspecifics, but comes at an overall cost to the group: individuals which produce4
polymers create a competitive environment which will lower overall group5
productivity.6
Bacteriocin production in bacteria may likewise be seen as a tragedy of the commons.7
The production of bacteriocins kill other conspecifics, as well as the focal individual8
[25, 26], but can benefit immune clonemates at the expense of susceptible, unrelated9
bacteria, which are the target of the bacteriocins. Bacteriocin production creates a10
situation where group productivity is reduced: while the individuals which produce11
the antibiotics stand to benefit, the group would do better if everyone restrained from12
producing bacteriocins. In this case, the social good is living in a bacteriocin-free13
environment, and this good is destroyed when all individuals produce bacteriocins. It14
is worthwhile noting that bacteriocin production is also susceptible to a type 2a social15
goods tragedy, in that it may be advantageous for immune bacteria to cheat by16
refraining from producing bacteriocins themselves [e.g. 27]. Indeed, the same17
behaviour may often include conflict over multiple types of resources and hence18
different types of tragedy.19
Collapsing and component tragedies20
The tragedy of the commons is commonly defined as a situation in which the selfish21
actions of individuals result in the complete collapse of the resource over which they22
are competing [1]. It is therefore important to add another layer of classification: how23
the tragedy affects the productivity of a group (note that the term ‘group’ should be24
9interpreted widely, extending to populations or species, depending on the scale and1
consequences of interactions between individuals).2
As such, we define a “collapsing” tragedy as a situation where selfish individual3
behaviour results in the entire resource vanishing (figure 1). For example, if the4
currency is a social good formed by cooperation, collapse would mean that the group5
loses the cooperative behaviour in question, and the social good ceases to exist. This6
type of tragedy can lead to the extinction of the whole group, if the resource or the7
social good was essential for its survival. An example of a “collapsing” tragedy is8
worker reproduction in the Cape honey bee, where workers cease to help the colony9
and instead invest in their own selfish reproduction, leading to very few individuals10
becoming workers, and in turn, colony collapse [28].11
Losing the resource completely is the most obvious form of a tragedy of the12
commons, but empirically it is difficult to observe resources that have already13
collapsed. A slightly weaker form of the tragedy of the commons occurs when the14
resource has been depleted, but not to the extent that it disappears completely. We15
define such a tragedy as the “component” tragedy, the word “component” being16
borrowed from the Allee effect literature [29]. A component Allee effect is a density-17
dependent process which reduces some component of fitness at low densities, and it18
differs from demographic Allee effects in that the component Allee effect does not19
necessarily diminish population growth, because other fitness components might20
compensate. Component tragedies similarly result in a lower average fitness for the21
group, as a result of selfish competition, but the group is still able to persist on the22
resource in question (type 1 in Table 2) or benefit to some degree from the social23
good (type 2 and 2b in table 2): the resource has not disappeared completely. Figure 124
10
shows the conceptual difference between a component and a collapsing tragedy of the1
commons.2
Component tragedies are likely to be very common (Table 1), as they simply reflect3
the argument from the levels of selection debate that individual-level selection is4
usually stronger than higher-level selection. One could argue that a too broad5
definition renders a term less useful — indeed, whenever there is conflict between6
individual and common good, the latter is expected to be sacrificed to some extent at7
least. However, not all competitive scenarios lead to component tragedies (see Box 2).8
Therefore, there is no tautology. Instead, identifying whether and under which9
conditions such tragedies occur should be useful. Likewise, it is important to10
differentiate between component and collapsing tragedies.11
Interestingly, the same trait may be observed at many points of the continuum12
between component tragedy and collapse. An example of this is caste fate in social13
insects [9]: if all individuals become queens, the colony breaks down and a collapsing14
tragedy is reached [28]. However, a partial resolution of the conflict turns the15
situation into a component tragedy, as in Melipona bees, where more workers than the16
colony optimum, but not all, become queens. This demonstrates that a component17
tragedy is a relative concept: a decrease in group fitness compared to a hypothetical18
situation in which individuals would behave “unselfishly”. Indeed, what counts as19
zero selfishness is a question with many possible answers. A sensible suggestion [8] is20
that extent of a given tragedy could be measured as the deviation in group success21
from that of a group in which individuals share the same interests and behave in a way22
that is optimal for the group. In some cases, it can also be useful to quantify the23
11
opposite deviation, i.e. how far away is the group resource from complete collapse1
[30].2
Resolving the tragedy3
One of the main advantages of using the tragedy of the commons as an analogy in4
evolutionary biology is that it forces us to ask the question why a tragedy of the5
commons is not observed in a particular scenario [Table 1, 14, 30]. The fact that we6
can observe significant amounts of cooperation despite the selfish interests of free7
riders and cheaters raises the question of why component tragedies do not always8
become collapsing tragedies, or why individuals in some cases cooperate so diligently9
that even component tragedies are absent. The latter can be defined as a ‘resolved10
conflict’ and is illustrated by cases of no significant colony-level costs of conflicts in11
insect colonies [30].12
Restraining may be individually optimal13
By definition, a tragedy of the commons will not arise if there are direct benefits to14
restraint. Therefore, apparently ‘resolved’ tragedies may, upon examination, turn out15
not to be tragedies in the first place. Direct benefits of restraint behaviour are16
especially likely to occur with social goods. For example, in sentinel behaviour in17
meerkats, cheating may not confer benefits if vigilant individuals have a direct18
personal advantage from being watchful [21].19
Population structure and kin selection20
One of the most commonly invoked mechanisms whereby conflicts may be resolved21
— both fully or partially (i.e. leading to component rather than collapsing tragedy) —22
12
is kin selection [31]. In the absence of policing mechanisms, if individuals interact1
locally with other highly related individuals, but compete for resources with all2
individuals in a population, competitive restraint will be favoured [32]. Kin selection3
(also mathematically interpretable as group selection [e.g. 15]) is likely to be4
important in any situation where populations are structured in some way [33], such as5
into groups [34] or in space [35]. Population structure helps to align the interests of6
the individual with the interests of the group. This means that any reduction in group7
productivity which results from individual-level selfishness will come at an inclusive8
fitness cost to the focal individual, and hence over-exploiting a common resource will9
be less beneficial. As a result, groups of related individuals which show restraint in10
competition over a common resource will be favoured over groups in which11
individual-level competition results in a tragedy of the commons.12
Coercion and punishment13
Coercion and punishment are among the most widely studied mechanisms for14
avoiding a tragedy of the commons, both in the evolutionary literature [6, 36-38] as15
well as in human sociobiology studies [e.g. 38]. These factors play a part in private16
ownership of the resource (e.g. attempts to steal are punished) as well as17
governmental control of resources [1] through the manipulation of payoffs (e. g. via18
taxes). Coercion (where individuals manipulate and put pressure on others) has been19
shown to be a potential force in altering the payoffs in animal societies [6]. Perhaps20
the most sophisticated examples can be found in social insect colonies, where21
“policing” individuals ensure that colony workers act to the benefit of the whole22
colony and do not reproduce for their own selfish interest: worker-laid eggs are23
regularly eaten by other workers [39].24
13
While punishment can undoubtedly stabilize cooperation, for example between1
legumes and their rhizome bacteria [40], it is interesting to note that such behaviour2
also can be subject to a social goods tragedy of the commons in itself. We face a3
second-order free-rider problem: when punishment is costly to the punisher, there is4
an individual-level temptation not to punish cheaters [e.g. 41]. As such, higher-order5
punishment (punishing individuals who do not punish) may be needed in such a6
scenario [41]. But because this raises the same free-rider question at a higher level7
(i.e. why not save energy by not punishing those who do not punish), punishment is8
undoubtedly easier to explain in cases in which the punishing act itself is not costly,9
such as egg-eating by policing workers, or when punishers receive more cooperation10
from others [42].11
Diminishing returns and ecological feedbacks12
The benefits from overexploiting a resource are not always linear: they often diminish13
as individuals try to compete more intensely for them. Diminishing returns can14
therefore prevent a tragedy by reducing the overall benefit gained from increasingly15
investing in a selfish behaviours [e.g. 8]. Diminishing returns are likely to be common16
in a range of organisms, particularly when the individuals cannot make full use of the17
extra resources that they acquire [8]. For example, the reproductive benefit of18
possessing an ever-increasing territory is very likely diminishing: extremely large19
territories prevent the individual from utilizing all its resources because other factors20
become limiting (ultimately, speed of travel while foraging could prevent collecting21
all resources). Thus, diminishing returns may put a break on overexploitation.22
Diminishing returns may also resolve potential public good tragedies, as in the case of23
blood sharing by vampire bats. Hungry bats need blood much more than ones that24
14
have recently fed, and this diminishing benefit of the state of an individual can alter1
the balance of reciprocal aid by diminishing the benefit gained by a cheater who will2
not share with other individuals even when it has fed properly [8].3
Feedback between the size of the population (or group) and the intensity of conflict4
[43, 44] is a related phenomenon that is also likely to be important in reducing the5
intensity of conflicts. If conflict and competition have a negative impact on the6
number of individuals in a population, then this will automatically change the number7
of individuals there are to interact with, ultimately affecting the structure of the8
“game” [43]. Thus, selective pressures differ between low densities and high9
densities, creating a feedback between adaptive individual behaviour and population10
density. The strength of this feedback could therefore have an influence on the11
strength of the conflict itself, thereby preventing a collapsing tragedy [43]. A potential12
example is quorum sensing in bacteriocin production [45], where individual bacteria13
reduce their production of bacteriocins when the population density is low.14
What if the tragedy is not resolved?15
Collapsing tragedies can be difficult to observe because they often destroy the study16
object (the group or population, or the behavioural function that creates public goods).17
However, this does not necessarily transfer the subject to evolutionary oblivion when18
we consider that extinctions may have consequences for higher levels of selection,19
such as group selection or species-level selection [14, 34, 46]. Recent work20
demonstrates the potential for so-called evolutionary suicide [see 11]: precisely21
because individual-level selection typically prevails over higher-level selection,22
evolution is predicted to favour selfish individuals to the extent that it can lead to23
extinction of higher-level biological structures. Cancer, a selfish form of cell growth24
15
[47], can kill individual organisms. Similarly if individual-level conflict can cause1
population extinction, collapsing tragedies may have a large effect on species2
persistence: those overexploiting common goods are denied prolonged existence. This3
may result in selection at the species level [11, 46, 48].4
Species-level selection can thus act as a “conflict limiting” mechanism if species that5
have evolved high levels of conflict are driven extinct sooner than species in which6
conflicts are milder [49]. Recent results suggest that even if actual evolutionary7
suicide is not occurring, species with strong conflicts can render themselves8
vulnerable to competitive exclusion, and thus competition with other species can9
dramatically affect species persistence [e.g. 48, 50].10
If the tragedy of the commons can act as a selective force at the level of the species,11
we would expect to observe traits which limit or resolve the tragedy. Extant12
organisms are expected to have robust mechanisms against at least the most13
commonly occurring cheater mutants, as any collapsing tragedies that have occurred14
have weeded out populations that lack such mechanisms. For example, in social15
amoebas, certain cheating genotypes cannot proliferate because of pleiotropic effects16
preventing spore formation [51]. It is possible that such genetic architecture, which17
constrains cheating, could be selected for at the species level [48].18
Conclusion19
Hardin’s analogy remains a powerful one for describing how the selfish interests of20
individuals can bring about costs to all members of a group or population. Whether or21
not such conflicts are fully resolved, remain at the state of a component tragedy, or22
lead to a total collapse in group productivity, is a major question that has implications23
16
for social evolution, levels of selection, ecology of resource use, and several other1
important phenomena. The rising tide of research, in the context of the tragedy of the2
commons, will prove most useful if the types of tragedies involved are clearly3
defined, and if the studies provide a clear scale for calculating how far the group-level4
costs are from their possible minima or maxima.5
Perhaps the most challenging question lies in addressing the relative frequency at6
which tragedies arise with or without mechanisms to prevent them from reaching total7
collapses. Groups subject to a total collapse have a far shorter lifespan, which makes8
them difficult to study. In the light of ever-growing environmental concerns, thinking9
about the tragedy of the commons in evolutionary biology is of interest not only10
because of these evolutionary implications, but also because of the applied analogy to11
human societies dealing with environmental and other public goods problems (box 1).12
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Glossary1
Cheater: An individual that gains a benefit from the collective, without investing in2
the collective itself. These individuals can also be called “free-riders”.3
Collapsing tragedy: A situation in which selfish competition or free-riding escalates4
until the resource is fully depleted. This can cause the collapse of the entire5
population (i.e. extinction) if the resource was essential.6
Component tragedy: A tragedy of the commons where escalated competition stops7
before a collapse is reached.8
Cooperation: The act of individuals paying an individual cost to contribute to a9
collective benefit.10
Individual-level selection: Selection acting at the level of the individual, to favour11
individuals or genes which maximise their own fitness.12
Over-exploitation: The depletion of a resource beyond the point where sustainable13
use is possible.14
Payoff: The overall benefits and costs gained from a particular strategy or behaviour.15
Public good: A common resource which benefits all individuals in a group.16
Resolution: Absence of tragedy, i.e. a situation where an inherent conflict causes no17
group-level costs.18
Social good: A public good that is shared by all members of a population or group19
and is specifically created by cooperating individuals.20
25
Species-level selection: Selection that arises by differential extinction of species.1
Tragedy of the commons: A situation where individual competition reduces the2
resource over which individuals compete, resulting in lower overall fitness for all3
members of a group or population.4
Zero-sum game: A situation in which one individual’s gain is matched by other5
individuals’ loss. Cutting a cake and chess are both examples of zero-sum games.6
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Box 1. The tragedy of the commons in human environmental problems1
Hardin’s original essay dealt with both pollution and human over-population [1], but2
the main point of his article was that a common resource would always be over-3
exploited when utilized by self-interested individuals. Pollution, climate change and4
overexploitation of fisheries all involve public goods suffering from the free-rider5
problem, and are thus examples of the tragedy of the commons. For example, the6
collapse of North Atlantic Cod [52] shows how easily common resources can be over-7
exploited. People tend to value their own short-term self-interests over the long-term8
good of the planet, so it is difficult to solve environmental problems by appealing to9
individual goodwill only. Public awareness of resource limitation can even hasten10
overexploitation: endangered species are traded at higher prices when their perceived11
rarity increases [53]. Convincing participants to behave in a group-beneficial way12
requires that individuals trust that the desired outcome is reachable and that free-riders13
will not benefit. Such trust is difficult to create whenever data and experience show14
otherwise.15
A flipside of the tragedy of the commons is that avoiding it can often be beneficial to16
the players involved, and can be described as win-win situations if policies are17
improved. For example, right whales often become entangled in lobster fishing gear.18
While fishermen are unkeen to reduce their income, a comparison of Canadian and19
American lobster fisheries shows that reducing the risk of entanglement can be20
achieved with no economic cost [54]: reducing fishing effort leads to improved yield21
of lobsters per recruit. Similarly, despite considerable resistance and cynicism, marine22
reserves (areas where fishing is prohibited) can benefit all fisherman, even over the23
short-term [55]. Policy negotiations are difficult in these situations because people24
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distrust others, but also because long-term benefits are rarely given sufficient weight1
[56]. Without extensive education, such benefits are met with skepticism. For2
example, the population dynamic arguments that relate catch effort to expected yield3
in fisheries are not intuitively obvious. Easily perceived short-term individual benefits4
would help to solve these problems. For example, using people’s desire to improve5
their social reputation could prevent exploitation of the common good, as is seen in6
experimental “climate games” in which participants improve their reputation by7
investing publicly to sustain the global climate [57].8
The examples in table 1 show a wide range of tragedies, dealing with different9
resources, from external resources to social goods created by either cooperation or10
competitive restraint. What is striking is that organisms with little cognitive ability are11
frequently able to resolve the tragedy with little or no cognitive or communicative12
abilities. With our advantage of communication and foresight, solutions to human13
tragedies of the commons should be within reach, but they are best solved, as Hardin14
advocated, using “mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon”.15
16
17
18
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Table 1. Scenarios where the tragedy of the commons has been applied to evolutionary biology1
Context Which type of potential TOC? Does TOC occur? Study organisms References1
Virulence External Resource: Competition within
the host leads to higher / lower than
optimal virulence
Yes, but component only: multiple strains
produce higher virulence
Parasites, malaria,
bacteria
[12, 17, 25,
58]
No: competition restrained by severe resource
limitation (small host size)
Cestodes [59]
No, ER: multiple infections facilitate each other Virus phages [60]
Social goods, type a): Lack of
cooperation leads to lower than optimal
virulence
Yes, but component only : multiple strains
prevent forming of collaborative, virulent
structures
Parasites in general [61]
Interspecific
mutualism
Social goods, type a): Mutualisms break
down due to cheating by either party
Yes, but component only: cheating persists
when cheaters can avoid host sanctions
Plant-microorganism
interactions
[62]
See above No: prevented by kin benefits, vertical
transmission or local horizontal transmission,
partner choice and host sanctions; also by
Plant-microorganism
interactions, ant/termite
– fungus mutualisms
[8, 40]
29
diminishing returns
Social
cooperation
and conflict
Social Goods, type a): Cooperation
breaks down due to individual interests
Yes, collapse: cheaters potentially drive
population extinct
Microbes [11, 63]
See above Yes, but component only: when policing is
impossible
Social insects [9]
See above No: prevented by policing or punishment Social insects [6, 39]
No: prevented by competition for reputation Humans [64, 65]
No: prevented by rock-paper-scissor dynamics Humans [66]
Intra-
organismal
conflict
Social goods, type a): Competition
between genetic lineages within an
individual leads to lower individual
fitness
Yes, but component only: chimeras are less
productive than single-clone individuals
Slime molds [67]
Intra-
genomic
conflict
Social goods, type a): Conflict between
sex cromosomes over sex ratio
No: suppressed by autosomes Genomes [14]
Social goods, type a): Selfish genetic No: suppressed by “parliament of the genes”, Genomes [14]
30
elements promote unfair meiosis where genes not linked to the genes for meiotic
drive are selected to suppress the selfish
behaviour
Parent-
offspring
conflict
Social goods, type b): Competition
between offspring is costly
Yes, but component only: offspring begging is
so costly that it reduces offspring size
Plants [68]
Sexual
conflict
External Resource: Male harassment
harms population
Yes, but component only: male harassment
leads to population decline
Lizards [13]
See above No: prevented by reduced benefit of harassment
at lower population sizes, or female counter-
adaptations
Theory [11]
Social goods, type b): Competition for
mates leads to lower productivity
Yes, but component only: males invest in sperm
rather than nuptial gifts
Theory [69]
Social goods, type b): Large males are
selected for although they have lower
fecundity
Yes, collapse (theoretical prediction) Fish [11]
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Social Goods, type b): Both mating
partners in simultaneous hermaphrodites
prefer to play female
No: partners who refuse the male role are
punished
Sea slugs [70]
Competition
over sex-
ratio
Social Goods, type b): Reproductive
competition forces queens to overproduce
eggs, enabling workers to skew the sex
ratio against the optimum of queens
Yes, but component only: sex ratio in multiple-
queen colonies is more female biased than the
queen optimum
Ants [71]
Resource
competition
Social Goods, type b): Competition for
light / resources forces plants to invest in
growth (roots / height) rather than
productivity (shoots / seeds)
Yes, but component only: production is
suboptimal
Plants [7, 10, 72]
See above No: prevented by human intervention (crop
selection)
Plants [10]
Social Goods, type b): Competition for
water leads to high water uptake but low
yield
Yes, but component only: competition for water
favours aggressive water users although they
have lower productivity
Plants [73]
No: prevented by kin selection and/or spatial Plants [73]
32
segregation
Social Goods, type b): Competition
leads to high fixation rate of energy but
low yield
Yes, but component only: species which face
competition use high rate / low yield mechanisms
Microbes [74]
See above No: prevented by spatial structuring or costs to
cheating
Microbes [74]
1
1The references included here explicitly describe their study systems as a tragedy of the commons. Clearly, many other studies address the same issues.2
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Table 2. A 2 by 3 classification of the types resources prone to a tragedy of the1
commons2
Resource Conceptual description
of resource
Example of
resource
Example of a
tragedy of the
commons
involving the
resource
Type 1
A pre-
existing
resource
An extrinsic resource
over which individuals
in a group or
population compete
Females (in
the context
of male-
male
competition)
Male competition
for females leads
to decline in
female numbers
[13, 75]
(a)
Social Goods
– formed by
cooperation
A cooperative
environment – social
goods, which are
formed by individuals
within a group
cooperating
Cooperative
formation of
stalks
Microbe cheaters,
which would
usually
cooperate, drive
the population
extinct [19]
Type 2
Social
Goods
(b)
Social goods
– formed by
restraining
from conflict
A non-competitive
environment –
individuals restrain
from conflict
Short plants,
which can
invest all
resources
towards
reproduction
Competition for
light forces plants
to invest in
growth rather
than productivity
[10]
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Figure 1. Component and collapsing tragedies. We define a collapsing tragedy (green1
line) as one where complete selfishness causes the loss of all of the resource in2
question. A component tragedy is one where selfishness reduces the resource, but not3
to the extent where it is lost completely (blue line).4
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Figure 2. Examples of the three types of resources over which a tragedy of the1
commons may occur. (a) Over-exploitation of a pre-existing resource (type 1 in table2
2), shown here by virus phages overexploiting a host bacteria [12 ], (b) Dictyostelium3
discoideum, where a tragedy of the commons may occur if too4
many individuals invest in producing more spores, whilst abstaining from investing in5
the stalk structure necessary for reproduction [67], (c) plant competition for light,6
where a tragedy of the commons may occur when individuals forego the non-7
competitive environment created by abstaining from growing taller [76]. Photos by B.8
Kerr (a), K.R. Foster (b) & D.J. Rankin (c).9
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